II* The administrative and financial autonomy of parliamentary assemblies

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The autonomy of parliamentary assemblies is a question which one might describe as "cross-disciplinary" since it touches on all aspects of the organisation and functioning of parliaments. Even when limited to its administrative and financial dimensions, the question might seem too broad and as a result to elicit responses which are too general to be relevant. In fact the reverse is the case.

I sincerely thank my fifty-two colleagues (Annex 1) for the quality and detail of their responses. This embarrassment of riches has led me to present a report which will be at the same time both overfull and inevitably incomplete. I would therefore ask everyone to forgive me if they do not find an analytical discussion of their own response. Apart from in the Tables, I have only mentioned in particular the Assemblies which conveyed a viewpoint with especial clarity on some aspect of the problem or those which were an exception to the majority of responses.

Autonomy is not therefore an "empty shell" but a concrete reality which expresses in some way and to various degrees depending on the country, the shared specificity of the parliamentary phenomenon throughout the world. This is not surprising since autonomy is defined in effect by on the one hand non-dependence and non-subordination of Assemblies in relation to the Executive, and, on the other, by the possibility of the Assembly freeing itself at least partially from the rules of ordinary law so as to follow instead its own regulations.

This is what the responses revealed on **the basis for the principle of autonomy** which will be examined as an introduction to this report.

First of all, in almost all states, the principle of the autonomy of Parliament[1] is formally recognised in the constitutional texts. This recogni-

[1] Exceptions are the European Parliament, the Chamber of Representatives of Cyprus, the National Asembly of Kenya, and, to some degree, the Federal Assembly of Switzerland

tion is found either in the Constitution itself, one or more articles of which expressly sanction this autonomy (the principle of the separation of powers formally set out either in the text of the constitution or in a text having constitutional value (in France one speaks of the "bloc de constitutionnalité"), or as found among the general principles of law) or in the actual organisation of the three powers as described in the Constitution. It is this separation of powers, in particular in relation to the Executive, which is the basis for the autonomy of Assemblies.

However, the principle of autonomy is expressed differently in those assemblies which are not governed by a written constitution but by conventions and in which the principle of separation of powers has a particular meaning. Thus, in the United Kingdom, Parliament consists of the Crown, and the two Houses. Consequently one can but sympathise with the intellectual scruples of our colleague from the United Kingdom House of Commons when he recognises that it "is not easy to answer precisely" on the question of autonomy. Fortunately we read a few lines further on, from the same authoritative pen of the Clerk of the Mother of Parliaments, this modest statement: "it was only in 1341 that the House of Commons began ... to act in a wholly autonomous manner. It acted autonomously from this date onwards". We are greatly reassured. The same response applies "mutatis mutandis" to the House of Lords and for the Parliaments which belong to the Westminster tradition even when they have taken on a written constitution.

These variations in the expression of the principle of autonomy lead on to another reflection which is also rather relative. The very strong link which binds the autonomy of assemblies to the principle of the separation of powers or to the historical victory for their prerogatives could encourage us to see in the administrative and financial autonomy of a Parliament the criterion and the measure of the extent of its powers. The stronger the autonomy, the more Parliament has power. The example of the French Parliament which enjoys a strong autonomy in these areas leads us to apply this kind of reasoning with very great care. In other words if administrative and financial autonomy is often a necessary condition for the full exercise of its powers by a Parliament, it is not a sufficient condition - far from it.

This autonomy has a common characteristic in all Assemblies. It clearly does not preclude cooperation with the Government. The separation of powers from which it derives is characterised in the majority of Parliaments by a "flexible separation" or "separation-cooperation". It is thus that parliamentary autonomy exists in the institutional organisation of the State, to which Parliament belongs.

This autonomy has a purpose: to allow Parliament freely to exercise the competence with which it is invested by the Constitution. It is thus a functional autonomy which manifests itself in the possibility of each Assembly "determining its form of organisation and its procedures, electing its own bodies, in particular its committees, being convoked by its President/Speaker, and above all deciding on its own rules", to use the words of our colleague from the Bundestag.

In the hierarchy of laws, after the Constitution, the state authorities'acts adopted for the application of the Constitution, the general principles of rights and law, it is then the Rules of Parliament (in certain Parliaments they have a legislative value) which confirm and above all organise the administrative autonomy of each assembly. In a bicameral system, autonomy must be peculiar to each assembly, even if these two distinct autonomies have the same constitutional basis. This distinction merely reflects the respective roles of the two chambers, different and complementary, in the functioning of each country's institutions.

The fact that Parliament is an integral part of the state explains why in the majority of cases assemblies do not enjoy a legal personality to the extent that the State possesses such a personality.

However, exceptions confirm the rule. The clearest responses came from the two Chambers of the Netherlands and, above all, from the two Chambers of the Republic of Italy and in particular from our colleague in the Italian Senate who enumerated the principle attributes of the legal personality as "to have standing before a court, to acquire property, to agree contracts in law".

For many other parliaments the answer to the question remained in doubt. As our Egyptian and Portuguese colleagues observed, the response presumes that the notion of the State is clearly defined. In this context, it will be noted that the responses of two assemblies from the same Parliament were sometimes divergent: thus, the House of Commons of Canada answers "yes" whereas the country's Senate answers "no". The French Assemblée nationale gives a negative response where the French Senate expresses uncertainty, joining in this respect the Parliament of the United Kingdom.

In fact, as we will see, responses on the principle do not exhaust this question. It is the effective exercise of their prerogatives which demonstrates the degree of autonomy for assemblies and which reveals whether they possess the attributes of a legal personality in their totality, in part or not at all.

FIRST PART: THE SCOPE OF AUTONOMY

1. - The questions under this heading were primarily aimed at **measuring, in practice, the extent of the parliamentary autonomy** in the three areas of institutional powers, administration and finances of each assembly in its internal organisation.

1.1 - With the exception of the European Parliament where "the precise frontiers of its powers and functions ... have not yet been determined", almost all assemblies recognise an effective autonomy although variable in its institutional extent, that is to say, its powers. In fact the freedom of organisation and proceeding for parliamentary bodies such as committees and political groups confirms the autonomy found in constitutional law. The existence of the Rules of Parliament which apply through the exclusive authority of each Assembly (given their conformity to the Constitution) is the proof of an autonomy in the drawing up and application of procedure, strongly underlined by all Parliaments, even if parliamentary law is only a part of constitutional law.

However, this autonomy varies in the powers which the Constitution of each State recognises for Parliament. Powers for the same Parliament can be more or less great depending upon whether they concern the legislative function, budgetary powers or the scrutiny of government. It should be noted that many Upper Houses or Second Chambers mention the constitutional limitations of their powers (German Bundesrat, the Parliament of the United Kingdom, the Australian Senate); other assemblies explicitly limit their autonomy to parliamentary law and procedure (the Knesset of Israel, the National Assembly of Zambia), or only recognise a partial autonomy (Sri Lanka).

1.2 - Most Parliaments state that they effectively enjoy administrative autonomy characterised by an internal organisation of departments peculiar to themselves and by the authority and control exercised over parliamentary staff.

The overall appraisal of financial autonomy is more nuanced and thus more difficult to ascertain. On the one hand, the budget of each assembly is in effect part of the general budget of the State. In this context, it is effectively voted for by Parliament. But on the other hand the influence of, and even control of government, are far from negligible. More than half of the responses analysed state that financial autonomy is only partial and in three cases at least non existent.

We will see in the second part of this report the basis for these responses.

1.3 - In contrast with the above, all the assemblies have bodies with powers of decision and arbitration over internal organisation and functioning.

With the exception of the two Chambers of the United Kingdom who make clear that apart from select committees the Westminster model does not have permanent bodies but a practice of consultation of persons ("elder statesmen" or senior politicians), all Parliaments have permanent bodies which are elected and as a result autonomous and which take decisions at the highest level. Most often they are the Bureaux and the Presidents/Speakers of the assembly. Sometimes also the Vice Presidents/Deputy Speakers. The Bundestag draws attention to the "Council of Elders", the body for political management provided for in the Rules of Parliament, and the Presidium, whereas the Bundesrat mentions, in addition to the Bureau, a permanent consultative committee.

In the majority of Parliaments these bodies or authorities, in particular the President/Speaker and the Bureau, possess powers of management and arbitration both for policy questions and for questions of organisation and internal functioning, in particular in administrative and financial matters.

The Assemblée nationale and the Senate in France mention in this context the Questeurs who are part of the Bureau but have a specific administrative and financial role. This is also a characteristic common to the Italian, Romanian and Belgian Parliaments and to almost all the francophone African assemblies. This is why one might speak of a romano-francophone type of parliamentary organisation.

2. - Another way in which to appraise the extent of parliamentary autonomy is **to measure the protection enjoyed by assemblies and their members** in three particularly sensitive areas: security, social protection and the remuneration of members of parliament which are as important for the independence of those elected as material guarantees.

2.1 - The most elementary condition for the freedom of debate of an assembly is the security of its members and as a consequence the protection of its premises. It can be presumed that the more those responsible for security are dependent on the parliamentary authorities, the greater will be the autonomy of Parliament and the more will this security be ensured.

The content of the responses analysed has led to the drawing up of a table containing four criteria for autonomy:

- Are the control of entry (column 1) and the internal security of the precincts (column 2) secured by services answerable to the Assembly?

- Is the entry of the police into the parliamentary precincts subject to parliamentary authorisation (column 3)?
- Is there a parliamentary body which effectively has authority over staff and security forces within the assembly, and if so what is that body?

A clear majority (31 out of 49) answered positively to the four criteria of autonomy. This generality of positive responses to the four questions must not however obscure the following points:

- Apart from control of entry where half of the Parliaments employ their own staff, internal security is only established exclusively by parliamentary staff in a minority of cases. Eleven assemblies employed the police or the army and 9 had their own departments collaborate with these forces within their buildings.
- By contrast, in a large majority of Parliaments, entry of the police must be specially permitted by the parliamentary authorities.
- Finally, in almost all assemblies, the parliamentary bodies have express authority over security staff, even if they belong to an organisation external to Parliament.

Certain Parliaments (for example the Bundestag and the French Assemble nationale) state that the President/Speaker has the right to call on the army if necessary, others (the Belgian House of Representatives and Senate) that external security for the Parliament is also under the authority of the President/ Speaker.

The classification into three categories - autonomous, semi-autonomous and non-autonomous - is no doubt too schematic. The fact, for a Parliament, of reliance on the security forces of the State must be viewed in the context of the democratic traditions of the country, which allows for a certain coefficient of correction to this classification.

2.2 - Social protection of members of parliament

The assemblies which, by virtue of a special law or regulation, possess autonomous social protection arrangements for retirement and sickness are twice as numerous as those who do not. In these latter assemblies members of parliament benefit either from general arrangements for retirement and sickness insurance or from other arrangements (in particular those for civil servants and members of the government).

On the other hand, the existence of autonomous arrangements exclusively for elected representatives does not necessarily imply direct management by

Symbols: = signifies an average degree of autonomy
- signifies a weak degree of autonomy
+ signifies a strong degree of autonomy

Country	Control of Entry to Parliamentary Buildings	Maintenance of order and internal security	Authorisation for entry of police	Parliamentary authority	Autonomy
Australia					
House of Representatives	YES	YES	YES	President	+
				Serjeant at Arms	
Senate	YES	YES	YES	Usher of the Rod	+
Belgium					
House of Representatives	YES	YES (+ military guard)	YES	President	+
Senate	YES	IDEM	YES	President	+
Canada					
House of Commons	YES	YES	YES		+
				Serjeant at Arms	
Senate	YES	YES	YES		+
Croatia	YES	YES	YES	President	+
Czech Republic					
Chamber of Deputies	Police (special unit)	Police (special unit)	YES	NO	(project to establish separate parliamentary guard)
Senate	IDEM	IDEM	IDEM	IDEM	IDEM

Country	Control of Entry to Parliamentary Buildings	Maintenance of order and internal security	Authorisation for entry of police	Parliamentary authority	Autonomy
Denmark Folketinget	YES + Officer of Police	YES	YES		+
Egypt People's Assembly	Police	Police	YES	President	=
Estonia Parliament	NO (Estonian Police & Security)	NO (Estonian Police & Security)	YES	Bureau	=
European Parliament	YES	YES	YES	Deputy Secretary General	+
Finland	YES	YES	YES		+
France National Assembly	YES	YES + Republican Guard	YES	President, Questeurs, Secretary General or Director General	+
Senate	YES	IDEM	YES	IDEM	+
FYRof Macedonia Parliament		Special Service State Police	YES	President	=

Germany Bundestag	YES	YES	YES	President	+
Bundesrat	YES	YES (+ federal services)		President	+
Greece Parliament	Police	Police	YES	Speaker	—
Hungary National Assembly	Republican Guard (Interior Minister)	YES	NO		Proposal for greater autonomy
India Second Chamber	YES	YES	YES		+
Indonesia House of Representatives	YES + Police	YES + Police	NO		-
Ireland House of Representatives	Police + Army	Police + Army		Superintendent of the Chambers	-
Israel Knesset		YES	YES	Serjeant at Arms	+
Italy Chamber of Deputies	YES	YES	YES	President, Questeurs, Security Committee	+
Senate	YES	YES	YES	IDEM	+

Country	Control of Entry to Parliamentary Buildings	Maintenance of order and internal security	Authorisation for entry of police	Parliamentary authority	Autonomy
Kuwait Parliament	YES	YES	YES	Speaker	+
Namibia National Assembly	Police (Interior Minister)			Assembly	-
Netherlands First Chamber	YES	Police (under direction of the the departments of the Assembly)	YES (except investigation)	Security Department	+
Second Chamber	YES		YES		+
Nigeria National Assembly		Police + Republican Guard	YES	President	+
Philippines House of Representatives				Speaker Serjeant at Arms	+
Senate	YES	YES	YES	IDEM	

Portugal Assembly of the Republic	National Republican Guard	Public Security Police	YES	President Secretary General Security Officer	+
Romania Chamber of Deputies Senate	Security Service and Guard Security Service and Guard and Ministry of the Interior	YES (+ Special Department of the Assembly) Security Service and Guard and Ministry of the Interior	NO	Questeurs	(Project for reorganisation with regard to autonomy)
Russia Federation of	Federal Security (in cooperation)	Federal Security (in cooperation)	YES	NO	-
Senegal			YES	President	+
Spain Senate	Police	Police		President	=
Sri Lanka Parliament	YES	YES	YES	Speaker, Committee on Parliamentary Affairs	+
Sweden Parliament	YES	YES (eventually in cooperation with police)	YES	Bureau Administration Director, Head of Security Department	+

Country	Control of Entry to Parliamentary Buildings	Maintenance of order and internal security	Authorisation for entry of police	Parliamentary authority	Autonomy
Switzerland Parliament	Federal service	Federal service		President	=
Thailand House of Representatives	YES	YES	YES	Speaker	+
Senate				President	+
Turkey National Assembly	Police & Army	Police & Army	YES	Bureau	– (security project proposed)
United Kingdom House of Commons	Metropolitan Police	Metropolitan Police (except in session)		Serjeant at Arms	+
House of Lords				Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod	=
Uruguay Senate	YES	Police Special corps	YES	President	=
Zambia	YES	YES	YES	Speaker	+

Parliament. *Assemblies which have autonomous arrangements only intervene in a little more than half of cases involving the administration of sickness cover.* They intervene still less in the direct and total organisation of the *retirement* of their members. Either it is the government departments, social security or private insurance companies who are responsible or the assemblies cooperate with these bodies in a mixed management.

2.3 - The remuneration of members of parliament is in the majority of cases determined by law (sometimes on the basis of an article in the constitution which concerns parliamentary salaries), often with reference to the treatment of senior judges and civil servants. The determination of remuneration and salaries by the assemblies themselves accounts for almost the same number of respondents. One thus sees that in almost all cases the legislator, in general parliament, is involved directly in the determination of the main salary. The parliamentary bodies (such as the Bureau for example) intervene more frequently in the direct determination of the supplementary financial benefits. -

Cases of an exclusive management of salary and associated financial benefits by external organisations, such as Ministries of Finance, are rare. Administration by the assemblies is the rule but the calculation and payment are sometimes arranged in cooperation with government departments.'

3. - A limit to the scope of autonomy: the control of a court of law. By a large majority the Assemblies state that they are subject to the control of a court of law for all or part of their acts of administration and management.

A third of assemblies state that they are not under any form of judicial control, a third that they are subject to the general law in all matters and to various competent court authorities, a third that they are partially subject to the control of courts for some of their administrative actions (relations with third parties only, or on the other hand matters in dispute with all or some of the staff...).

Administrative courts are most frequently competent to deal with such disputes, especially when the control of the court of law is limited to certain administrative actions.

4. - The power to go to law, counterpart to the control of the court of law, exists in a majority of Parliaments.

It has most often a legal basis. It is exercised either by the Bureau, or by the President/Speaker, or sometimes by other bodies of the assembly such as committees. It seems that in these various instances the assembly is effectively represented by the Secretary General, the head of department, or a legal adviser specialising in this role. In other cases, it is private offices which exclusively provide this representation.

Legal proceedings are, in many parliaments, subject to initiation by the Prosecutor representing the government department or by a State body. Perhaps it is necessary to view this situation in the context of the absence of a legal personality for these assemblies but there is not always a clear correlation: thus the Netherlands Parliament possesses a legal personality without being subject to the control of a court of law and without being able to take part in court proceedings.

SECOND PART: FINANCIAL AUTONOMY

This essential aspect of autonomy will be dedicated both to budgetary autonomy and to autonomy over the parliamentary estate.

I - Budgetary autonomy

A common feature: in all parliaments with the exception of two (Zambia and the Bundesrat) and with some uncertainty for four assemblies, **the budget of each assembly is voted on in the plenary session.** Numerous assemblies noted that it is hardly debated, or not at all, and agreed without amendment even when successively examined by two chambers in bicameral parliaments (example of the Spanish Parliament). In the great majority of cases it is included within the draft budget of the state. In several assemblies (about a third of responses analysed) its agreement is through a vote on a separate estimate before or after that of the general budget.

1. - Drawing up of the budget

On the basis of the useable information conveyed by 46 assemblies, it appears that the preparation of the draft budget, before its presentation and the vote in plenary session, constitutes the determining phase for gauging the autonomy of each Parliament. Between the moment when the initial draft is prepared by the parliamentary departments and the presentation of the definitive draft to the assembly for debate and vote (if it is a distinct document to the general budget of the state) or to the Minister of Finance for inclusion in the general draft budget, then debate and vote by Parliament, two different situations are apparent.

In two thirds of cases the assemblies draw up their draft budget without the intervention of the government. The parliamentary authorities alone decide on the amount and the distribution of expenditure. It follows on from this that the

parliamentary authorities are careful not to present a budget which bears no relation to the general budget of the State and that they take account in particular of its rate of increase, of economic policy, even of announced austerity measures. But they do it freely and without the intervening decision of the Ministry of Finance.

A third of Parliaments are, by contrast, subject to the intervention of the Ministry of Finance. Negotiation takes place with the parliamentary authorities who draw up the budget in almost all cases before the parliamentary authority (bureau, President/Speaker, committees, according to the assembly) adopt the draft. In several cases, the intervention goes as far as imposing a decision (Zambia, the Australian Parliament).

By contrast, **certain assemblies state that they enjoy a genuine financial autonomy even though the draft budget is submitted for examination to the Minister of Finance.** This is for example the case for the German Bundestag or the Parliament of the United Kingdom who say that the government does not challenge the parliamentary budget. Usage and parliamentary tradition prevail over the letter of the law. In the same context the case of the French Parliament is relevant: the budget of the two assemblies which is definitively agreed by a mixed body (judges and questeurs) presided over by a Head of Section in the Auditor General's Department includes without amendment the proposals of the Questeurs of the Assemblée nationale and the Senate.

Country	Drawing up of Parliament's draft Budget				Debate and vote in Parliament	
	Draft preparation	External involvement	Adoption of draft	Presentation of draft	State Budget Bill	Separate Bill
Australia						
House of Representatives	Department of the House	Finance Department Office of Parliamentary Counsel (Agency)				
Senate		Idem				
Belgium						
House of Representatives						
Senate						
Canada						
House of Commons	Administration	No	Bureau			
Senate		No	Committee for Internal Economy			

Cyprus	Assembly	Finance Minister Council of Ministers				
Croatia	Parliamentary Secretary		President	US	Yes	
Czech Republic Chamber of Deputies	Bureau	No	Budget Committee General Assembly	Yes		
Senate	Bureau	No	Committee	Yes		
Denmark Folketinget	Administration (Secretary General)					
Egypt Parliament	Bureau	No		Assembly		Yes
Estonia Parliament	Finance Minister Government		Parliament	Finance Minister Government	Yes	
Finland Parliament		No	Parliamentary Committee	Finance Minister	Yes	

Country	Drawing up of Parliament's draft Budget				Debate and vote in Parliament	
	Draft preparation	External involvement	Adoption of draft	Presentation of draft	State Budget Bill	Separate Bill
France National Assembly Senate		No No		Finance Minister	Yes Yes	
FYRof **Macedonia** Parliament					Yes	
Greece Parliament	Services	No	Speaker		Yes	
Hungary National Assembly	Departments Speaker	Ministry of Finance				
India Second Chamber	Department of Secretary General	**No**				
Ireland House of Represen-tatives	Parliamentary Official Parliament Sub-Committee	Ministry of Finance Government		Ministry of Finance		

Israel Knesset		No	Committee			Yes
Italy Chamber of Deputies	Board of Questeurs	No				Yes
Senate	Idem	No				Yes
Kuwait Parliament		No			Yes negotiable with Finance Committee	
Namibia National Assembly	Secretary General Speaker	Ministry of Finance		Government	Yes	
Netherlands First Chamber	President Vice-Presidents	Ministry of Interior	Assembly		Yes	
Second Chamber	Secretary General Bureau	Ministry of Interior	Assembly		Yes	
Nigeria National Assembly	Secretary General	Government (negotiable)	Finance Committee		Yes	
Norway Parliament		No	Bureau	Government	Yes	

Country	Drawing up of Parliament's draft Budget				Debate and vote in Parliament	
	Draft preparation	**External involvement**	**Adoption of draft**	**Presentation of draft**	**State Budget Bill**	**Separate Bill**
Philippines Senate		Budget and Administration Department	Bicameral Committee Bureau of the President		Yes	
Portugal	Office of Secretary General	No		Government	Yes	
Romania Chamber of Deputies	Departments Questeurs	No	Bureau (on report from Questeurs) Budgetary Committee Assembly	Government	Yes	
Senate	Bureau	No	Idem	Idem	Idem	
Senegal National Assembly	Questeurs President	Finance Minister	Bureau	Finance Committee	Yes	
Spain Senate	Department of Secretary General		Bureau	Ministry of Finance	Yes	

Sri Lanka Parliament		No	Parliament (consultative committee)	Finance Minister Government	Yes	
Sweden Parliament		No	Bureau		Yes	
Switzerland Federal Assembly	Deputy Secretary General		Administrative Delegation	Finance Department	Yes	
Turkey National' Assembly		Negotiations	Speaker			
United Kingdom House of Commons House of Lords		Finance Minister Finance Minister	Finance and Administration Committee			
Uruguay Senate	President	No	Budgetary Committee and Internal Affairs Committee			
Zambia National Assembly			Speaker		No	**No**

2 - General structure and total amount of the budget

It is in the nature of Parliaments to generate expenditure and little by way of receipts.

2.1 - General structure

Under the heading of receipts which supplement the budgetary resources in the majority of Parliaments one will find: the sale of parliamentary documents and publications, receipts from cafeterias and restaurants, the renting and leasing of rooms. A certain number of Parliaments make clear that apart from their budgetary resources they have no receipts.

The structure of expenditure is, however, revealing on the actual administration of assemblies. The distribution of the main items of expenditure is evidently very general. It does not take account of the detail of the items contained within the costs of the functioning of the services and facilities used by members of parliament (telephone, fax machine, photocopier, means of transport, etc.). The distinction between the cost of the remuneration and financial benefits of members of parliament on the one hand and the salaries and pensions of staff on the other is not made by the great majority of assemblies. Some partial indications lead me to believe that expenditure on the remuneration of members of parliament and that for staff are on average of a comparable order of magnitude.

It is clear, however, that many Parliaments include in their budget the distinction between administrative expenditure and expenditure on equipment, or between ordinary expenditure and capital expenditure, but the principal items of expenditure common to all assemblies are the following in decreasing order of importance:

- The remunerations and pensions (expenditure on personnel) which comprise remuneration and financial benefits and pensions of members of parliament on the one hand, the salaries and pensions of staff on the other.
- Administrative expenditure which covers the services and various equipment at the disposal of members of parliament (in particular, meeting expenses, purchase of equipment, office supplies, publication costs ...).
- Grants, in particular to political groups (and possibly to parties).
- Expenditure on equipment, including buildings.
- Other.

% of budget	Principal items of expenditure				Others
	Remunerations Pensions	Administration	Grants to groups	Investments buildings	
-5			2 assemblies[2]	10 assemblies[3]	
5 to 10			2 assemblies"	2 assemblies[5]	
10 to 20	2 assemblies[6]	5 assemblies[7]	2 assemblies[8]	1 assembly[9]	
20 to 30		7 assemblies[10]		1 assembly"	
30 to 40	3 assemblies[12]	4 assemblies'[3]		1 assembly[14]	
40 to 50		3 assemblies'[5]		2 assemblies'[6]	
50 to 70	10 assemblies'[7]				
70 to 90	7 assemblies[18]				

N.B.: This partial analysis reflects the variation in the detail of responses which differed from one assembly to another. It suggests however significant trends.

[2] France (Assemble nationale); Norway.

[3] Belgium (House of Representatives, Senate); Canada (Senate); Denmark (Folketinget); Finland; France (Assemblée nationale); Germany (Bundestag, Bundesrat); Italy (Senate); Nigeria.

[4] Finland; Italy (Senate).

[5] Sweden; Uruguay (Senate).

[6] Czech Republic (House of Represenatives, Senate).

[7] Cyprus (House of Representatives); Croatia; France (Assemble nationale); Italy (Senate); Uruguary (Senate).

[8] Denmark (Folketinget); Germany (Bundestag).

[9] Norway.

[10] Australia (Senate); Canada (Senate); Germany (Bunedstag, Bundesrat); Namibia (Assemble nationale); Niger; Norway.

[11] United Kingom (House of Commons).

[12] Sweden; United Kingdom (House of Commons, House of Lords).

[13] Czech Republic (House of Representatives); Ireland (House of Representatives); United Kingdom (House of Lords); Sweden.

[14] United Kingdom (House of Lords).

[15] Australia (House of Representatives); Denmark (Folketinget); Greece.

[16] Czech Replublic (House of Representatives, Senate).

[17] Italy (House of Representatives); Finland; Belgium (HouSe of Representatives); Croatia; Germany (Bundestag, Bundesrat); Namibia (National Assembly); Netherlands (First Chamber); Niger.

[18] Australia (Senate); Belgium (Senate); Canada (Senate); Cyprus (House of Representatives); France (Assembled nationale); Italy (Senate); Uruguay (Senate).

In the distribution of the main items of expenditure, the analysis of the responses of the majority provides a revealing profile of these trends.

Remunerations: + 60%

Administration: 20%

Grants: 10%

Investments: 5%

Others: 5%

Like all snapshots, this is rather approximate. The preponderant share for remunerations for all categories of person is clearly indicated in a good many responses and the great majority of assemblies undoubtedly devote more than 60 per cent to this remuneration. As for investments, essentially heavy works and acquisitions concerning buildings, the lesser amount of 5 per cent reflects the ordinary situation of the majority.

On the other hand, the share for what we have called administration is more difficult to evaluate because of the different descriptions and classifications. The share for grants has been very precisely indicated by several Parliaments.

As for other expenditure, it has not been possible to delineate them because they cover very diverse items depending on the assembly.

2.2 - The share of the budget of Parliament within the State's budget

The table below reproduces whatever response has been supplied by the assemblies themselves in their response to the questionnaire.

ASSEMBLY	SHARE OF THE BUDGET WITHIN THE STATE'S BUDGET
Australia	
Chamber of Representatives	0.36
Senate	0.05
Canada	
Senate	0.03
Cyprus	0.02
Czech Republic	
Chamber of Deputies	0.25
Senate	0.16

Denmark Folketinget	0.011
Estonia Parliament	0.9 maximum
Finland	0.1
France Assemblée nationale Senate	0.17 0.09
Germany	0.2
Greece	1.6
Hungary National Assembly	1
Indonesia Chamber of Representatives	1.17
Ireland Chamber of Representatives	0.29
Namibia National Assembly	0.48
Netherlands First Chamber Second Chamber	0.07 0.15
Norway Parliament	0.086
Philippines Chamber of Representatives Senate	0.03 0.16
Romania Chamber of Deputies Senate	0.00169 0.89
Russia Council of the Federation	0.04
Senegal National Assembly	0.87